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Turkey and the United States
The recent evolution of US-Turkish relations highlights broader challenges of the transition from American unipolarity to a still inceptive ‘multipolar world’. The relationship cannot 
be understood unless its evolution during the 20th century is contrasted with the recent 
reality of the fl uid interaction between a self-described ‘emerging power’ (Erdogan, 2011) 
with regional aspirations and a global superpower with extended interests in Turkey’s many 
neighbourhoods (including the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East) but a declining 
international infl uence. 
In this context, the ultimate test for the Turkish-US relationship does not lie in Turkey choosing between 
‘West’ and ‘East’. The challenge is, rather, about America and its long-standing European allies (including 
Turkey) being able to redefi ne the West and reaffi rm its relevance, as American unipolarity is replaced 
by an interdependent but also more plural international environment. The Turkish-US relationship will 
remain in fl ux in the years to come not only because of the instability that characterizes one of Turkey’s 
neighbourhoods, the Middle East, but also because it epitomizes more broadly the internal convulsions 
of the West in an age of hegemonic transition and global change.
As America explores the foundations of a new relationship with Turkey, Ankara is called to determine 
how much of its current ambition as a rising actor can be sustained in the longer run by a more 
independent course and to what extent its strategic aspirations can still be more effectively served by 
reliance on traditional alliances, such as the one with the US, and participation in international Western 
institutions of which Turkey has been for decades a loyal member, such as NATO. 
One thing is certain: the relationship will remain diffi cult for Washington and Ankara to manage until 
new geopolitical realities are acknowledged and sources of mistrust are honestly discussed with a view 
to extinguishing them. America’s dialogue with Turkey is impaired by a certain patronizing attitude 
that characterizes also the US approach to other ‘junior partners’. This is evident in the recurrent 
US debates on the risk of ‘losing Turkey’ (which assume that at some point Turkey was at America’s 
disposal) and in the tendency of the Washington policy community to treat Turkey as an ‘issue’ instead 
of as an ‘actor’, as openly lamented by Turkish elites. This attitude, moreover, has been coupled with 
the diffi culty to contain the infl uence of a wide array of Turkey’s detractors in the US, which can be 
found among elements of the political elite obsessed with the risk of Turkey’s ‘Islamization’, pro-Israel 
groups, or among representatives of the American Armenian Diaspora.
Turkey’s view of the US, on the other hand, is negatively affected by a widespread conspiracy mentality 
which leads many Turks to resent US ‘imperialism’, long-standing fears about America’s involvement 
with Kurdish separatism (despite years of shared intelligence and military cooperation against groups 
such as the PKK), and by the tendency to hold Washington accountable for any stance taken by Israel. 
The latter has been a regional ally of Turkey for decades, but in particular since Israel’s Gaza offensive 
in 2008, the relationship has been fraying as ever larger sections of the Turkish elite and public have 
held Israel responsible for human rights violations against the Palestinians, and harshly criticized the 
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Israeli government for its allegedly uncompromising 
and zero-sum-game approach to relations with 
Muslim communities in the region. This evolution has 
signifi cantly complicated Turkish-US relations. Both 
anti-US and anti-Israel sentiments are becoming more 
widespread among the Turkish public (Transatlantic 
Trends). 
THE BACKGROUND 
The golden age of Turkish-American relations during 
the Cold War is largely a legend. As with other 
relationships between the American superpower 
and regional allies, diffi culties emerged at various 
points, including the tensions which erupted in the 
early 1960s over the future of the US nuclear capable 
missiles stationed on Turkish soil during the Cuban 
missile crisis, and US sanctions and arms embargo 
against Turkey following the Turkish army’s invasion 
of Cyprus in 1974. Turkey’s participation in US-led 
international alliances, moreover, did not invariably 
translate into a strategic restraint, as evidenced by 
the repeated tensions between Turkey and Greece – 
two NATO allies – over issues such as their respective 
possessions in the Aegean.
Furthermore, the question of Turkey’s belonging to 
the West was no less complex than is today; it was 
simply less debated in international circles. Not many 
US leaders during the Cold War identifi ed Turkey’s 
semi-democratic system and the pattern of repeated 
military coups (1960, 1971, and 1980) as formidable 
impediments to the nation’s development as a 
Western country. What was different until the 1990s 
was not so much the stability of Turkish-US relations, 
but rather the relative clarity and predictability of 
the larger strategic context: an international system 
divided into two main blocs, organized under US 
leadership in the West, with Turkey fi rmly siding with 
anti-Soviet countries. 
Turkey’s support for the US-led international 
intervention against Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 
1990 seemed to suggest that Ankara could become 
a critical regional partner in the establishment of 
the ‘new world order’ envisioned by George H. W. 
Bush. But the 1990s proved to be a critical period 
of change for Turkey, with a mixed impact on its 
international orientation and relationship with the 
US. In the context of a rapidly evolving international 
system no longer divided into blocs, Turkey soon 
realized that it was no longer sealed in the Western 
camp and confi ned to the role of a diligent guardian 
of NATO’s southern fl ank. Thanks to the reforms 
passed during the Turgut Özal era (1983-1993), 
which the US supported, the country liberalized its 
market internally while opening up its economy, thus 
laying out the foundations of a new, multidirectional, 
regional integration. This led to a renewed interest 
in European integration but also to establishing links 
with countries in Turkey’s rediscovered southern 
and eastern neighbourhoods, which in some cases 
happened to be in America’s ‘black list’, such as Iran.
Clashes with the Kurds, moreover, intensifi ed and 
Islamist movements rose to political prominence, 
risking undermining Turkey’s secular identity, and its 
ongoing liberalization process, as well as its Western 
strategic orientation. Particularly troublesome for 
Washington was Turkey’s inclination in the 1990s 
to interpret its newly-found active regional role as 
requiring confrontation with its neighbours in some 
cases. Growing tensions with Greece in the mid-to-
late 1990s were viewed with great alarm as they 
could lead to open confl ict between two US allies in 
the already confl ict-ridden Balkans. Turkey’s strains 
with Syria, which led to a showdown in 1998 that 
stopped just short of war, caused great concern for 
their possible broader regional ramifi cations even if 
they helped cement the Turkish-Israeli alliance.
‘NEW TURKEY’ AND US-TURKISH RELATIONS
The 2000s brought with them a set of new challenges 
for Turkish-US relations. America supported the single 
most important societal and political development 
taking place in Turkey: the rise of the post-Islamist, 
culturally conservative, market-oriented Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) – which represented at 
once the rise of the Anatolian Turkish elites and the 
decline of the traditional urban Kemalist secular 
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establishment. Recep Tayip Erdogan was received in 
Washington in 2002 and met with the US president 
before he became the country’s Prime Minister and 
when he was still a relatively unknown international 
fi gure – a non ritual, exceptional event. The idea 
that as a secular democracy, ruled by a moderate 
Islamic party, Turkey could boost America’s efforts 
to communicate and implement a new agenda of 
change in the Middle East after the 9-11 attacks 
was appealing in US circles, particularly conservative 
and neoconservative ones, then in charge of foreign 
policy.
This vision, however, was soon to prove largely 
delusory. The Turkish Grand National Assembly’s 
‘no’ vote to logistical support to the US-led invasion 
of Iraq in 2003 was just the fi rst act of a long saga 
featuring a rising regional actor who has, since 
then, in many instances resisted or opposed US 
actions in the Middle East that Washington has 
justifi ed as promoting security and democracy, but 
that have translated into new instability around 
Turkey’s borders. The specter that has constantly 
haunted Ankara is that of a Kurdish state arising 
from the ruins of post-Saddam Iraq, powerful enough 
to support Kurdish separatism in Turkey’s South 
East. The concern, however, has gradually become 
larger. As an actor increasingly integrated with the 
economies of its neighbouring countries (including 
some of America’s rivals such as Iran and Syria), 
Turkey has found it diffi cult to accept US-sponsored 
policies aimed at altering the already fragile balances 
of the Middle East with the goal of imposing Western 
outcomes. 
Therefore, US-Turkish relations have become tense 
since 2003 not because Turkey ‘has gone Islamist’, 
but because the alliance has not fully adjusted to 
the new reality of Turkey as a regional power with 
its own legacies and interests in its neighbourhood. 
In this context, the economic, strategic, security, 
as well as psychological impact of the Afghan and 
Iraq wars on Turkey – both taking place next to its 
borders, but conceived and run by Washington – has 
been consistently underestimated by the US. The 
US foreign policy elite has preferred to focus on 
the ‘new directions’ of Turkish foreign policy rather 
than to acknowledge America’s own foreign policy 
transformation – from a guarantor of stability to an 
agent of transformation (and sometimes a factor of 
instability) in the Greater Middle East – especially 
during the Bush years.
Faced with an American counterpart only limitedly 
receptive of Turkish claims and views, Ankara’s 
growing inclination has been that of distinguishing 
itself from US policies in the region, by emphasizing 
the use of ‘soft power’ as opposed to hard means, 
and the need for dialogue and cooperation, instead 
of competition, even with the more problematic 
regimes. This has led to initiatives that have 
created signifi cant disagreement and tensions with 
Washington, such as Ankara’s engagement with 
Hamas in Palestine, the shift from confrontation 
to cooperation with Syria in the 2000s (when 
Washington was on the contrary trying to isolate 
Damascus), but also to valuable mediating efforts, 
such as Ankara’s brokerage in 2008 of peace talks 
between Syria and Israel. 
Turkey has, in fact, shown considerable convergence 
with US policies and goals when stability was the 
main objective and diplomacy was as central as 
hard power: the stabilization Afghanistan (to which 
Turkey has contributed by participating in the political 
dialogue as well as by sending aid and troops), 
Lebanon (in which Turkey has played a critical role 
in the UN peace mission), as well as post-war Iraq. 
Initially focused on a largely unilateral military effort 
to stop the transborder activities of Kurdish violent 
groups, Ankara has later pursued engagement with 
the new Iraqi Kurdish authorities in Northern Iraq as 
a more promising way to confront the PKK threat 
and to prevent the rise of a hostile neighbouring 
Kurdish state more broadly. Turkey has got deeply 
involved in the political discussions among Sunni 
and Shite Iraqi factions and the Americans with 
the objective of avoiding a protracted civil war and 
preventing the fragmentation of the Iraqi state into 
new independent entities, including a Kurdish one, 
next to Turkey’s borders.
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has turned more nationalistic, becoming increasingly 
fascinated with the idea of Turkish ‘non-alignment’ 
or an ‘independent foreign policy’.
Cooperation with the US in the stabilization of 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Lebanon, and Iraq has 
continued. At the same time, however, in particular 
relations with Iran and Israel have caused deep 
tensions reverberating across the Atlantic. As already 
mentioned, Turkish-Israeli relations have become 
particularly tense after Israel’s Gaza offensive of 
2008. Although itself sometimes critical of Israel’s 
policies, the Obama administration has seen with 
concern Turkey’s choice to dramatize its differences 
with Jerusalem and to capitalize on the region’s 
negative views of Israel to boost its image among the 
Arab peoples. The ‘Mavi Marmara’ incident in May 
2010, which brought Turkish-Israeli relations to an 
all-time low, materialized Washington’s worst fears. 
Even if the US has mainly focused on preventing 
confl ict between its two allies, Ankara has seen 
Washington’s reactions to the incident as betraying 
a clear pro-Israel bias. 
Relations with Iran have too created deep tensions 
with Washington. Turkey’s ‘no’ vote in June 2010 
on UN-mandated sanctions against the Republic of 
Iran caused damage to America’s efforts to build 
international consensus on the Iranian nuclear 
question and infl icted a major blow to the Turkish-
US relationship (the Obama administration insisted 
until the last moment that Turkey would at least 
consider abstention). Contending that isolation is 
not an effective strategy for stopping Teheran’s 
nuclear plans, Ankara has decided to keep cultivating 
its economic relationship with Iran, embracing an 
open-ended dialogue with the regime without the 
threat of coercion. This is a path that no EU country or 
NATO ally considers any longer acceptable or viable. 
America’s selection of priorities in the Middle East 
and its securitized approach to relations in the region 
may be questionable from the Turkish perspective. It 
is signifi cant and alarming, however, that on an issue 
as important as Iran, the Turkish – US relationship 
Despite this blend of orientations and policies, the 
debate in the US has increasingly revolved around the 
question (for some already a reality) of Turkey’s ‘drift’ 
from the West. Although the disagreement over the 
handling of Iraq had ceased to be an issue by the 
time the Bush administration fi nished its second term, 
both Turkish and US leaders could agree at the end 
of the 2000s that the relationship needed a major 
overhaul if levels of strategic convergence similar to 
the one achieved during the Cold War were to be 
ever attained again. 
US-TURKISH RELATIONS DURING THE OBAMA 
ADMINISTRATION
The Obama administration has to be credited 
with the attempt to ‘modernize’ the relationship 
with Turkey (Gordon, 2010). The many faces of 
what has come to be known as ‘new Turkey’ have 
been carefully taken into account, even though 
old metaphors, including the ‘bridge between the 
West and the East’ one, have too often offered the 
foundation of an understanding of contemporary 
Turkey that tends to remain stereotyped. While trying 
harder to understand Turkey, the US administration 
has conducted a review of America’s role in the 
Middle East as part of a broad refl ection on the US 
international strategy in a globalizing world. The US 
has also reviewed its relations with the ‘emerging 
powers’, espousing the paradigm of ‘engagement’ 
over containment or confrontation. Understanding 
how critical the relationship with Turkey is to such 
undertaking, the Obama administration has sought 
a ‘model partnership’ with Ankara (Obama, 2009), 
as if by engaging with the ‘new Turkey’ Washington 
intended to send a signal to other Muslim countries 
and emerging powers more broadly. 
Three years into the Obama administration, however, 
frustration is the common feeling in Washington. 
Faced with a stalling accession process to the EU, 
persisting suspicion in US circles, but above all 
galvanized by its economic success and growing 
infl uence in its neighbourhood, the Turkish ruling elite 
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has failed to deliver. Fraying relations with Israel, 
moreover, have raised serious doubts in Washington 
about the concrete implementation of Ankara’s 
self-styled ‘zero problems with neighbours’ policy. 
Turkey has stressed that its goal is the same of the 
US and European countries: peace and prosperity in 
the region. But as Turkey redefi nes its place in the 
changed strategic context, it will fi nd it increasingly 
hard to shield behind the appealing but largely 
neutral formula of ’stability’. Turkey’s rise and 
the rapidly evolving regional environment will by 
defi nition require Ankara to choose priorities and 
select partners. The most recent developments in 
North Africa and the Middle East underscore this 
problem.
Turkey has been arguably more prompt than the 
US, and certainly more than EU countries, to lend 
its support to the Arab movements demanding 
change. Turkey’s claim that it represents a source of 
inspiration for Muslim societies demanding better 
governance and more equitable development has 
not been contested by Obama administration, which 
on the contrary has appreciated Turkey’s aspiration 
to play an active role in facilitating and securing 
the democratic transitions in countries like Egypt 
and Tunisia.
Turkey’s attitude towards Libya and Iran, and its 
close ties with an authoritarian regime such as Syria, 
however, have highlighted serious contradictions 
in Turkish policy, and revealed the possibility for 
continued tension with the US in the region. 
Ankara expressed reservations about the adoption 
of economic sanctions against Libya and initially 
opposed military intervention against the Gaddafi  
regime. As in the past, Turkey has also remained 
embarrassingly silent on popular protests in Iran, just 
as when the Iranian opposition and Washington were 
instead hoping that that the ‘Arab spring’ could give 
leverage to the Iranian people to fi nally overthrow 
the Ahmadi-Nejad regime in Teheran. 
Turkey’s diffi cult balancing act between endorsing 
democratic change and preserving stability and 
good relations with some of its regional partners 
highlight tradeoffs and dilemmas that the US and 
other Western countries are themselves facing. The 
recognition that this is the case should lead Turkey 
to actively seek consultation and coordination with 
Washington. Turkey has been right to reject the view 
that the US or the EU can decide on its behalf what 
Western policy is, especially in its neighbourhood. 
Ankara is also right that the emergence of a 
multipolar order compels a review of Western 
strategy and a rebalancing of the relationship 
between the American superpower and its allies 
so as to accommodate the new geo-economic and 
geopolitical realities. However, if it is interested 
in developing this idea, Ankara should now be 
proactive in engaging Western allies on its views, 
promoting a dialogue with the US and the EU on 
how the Middle East should develop in the years 
ahead. Faced with an America only slowly revising its 
long-held assumptions and policies and an EU that 
is divided on its views of Turkey, Ankara’s activism 
in the most recent years has seemed directed at 
carving out a space for itself more than at seriously 
developing a new idea of international engagement 
agreeable also to Washington. ■
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